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Abstract
The well-known Church-Fitch paradox shows that the verificationist knowability
principle all truths are knowable, yields an unacceptable omniscience property. Our
semantic analysis establishes that the knowability principle fails because it misses the
stability assumption ‘the proposition in question does not change from true to false
in the process of discovery,’ hidden in the verificationist approach. Once stability is
made explicit, the resulting stable knowability principle accurately represents verifi-
cationist knowability, does not yield the omniscience property, and can be offered as
a resolution of the knowability paradox.
Two more principles are considered: total knowability stating that it is possible
to know whether a proposition holds or not, and monotonic knowability stemming
from the intrinsically intuitionistic reading of knowability. The study of these four
principles yields a “knowability diamond” describing their logical strength. These
results are obtained within a logical framework which opens the door to the systematic
study of knowability from a logical point of view.
1 Introduction
Knowability is analyzed in a logical framework with the alethic modalities 2 (necessary),
3 (possible), and the epistemic modality K. Modalities 2/3 represent, in an abstract way,
the process of discovery. The logical principles are considered as schemes of axioms hence
subjects of the usual logical rules, e.g., necessitation.1
∗The research is supported in part by NSF grant 0830450.
†Supported in part by a Doctoral Student Research Grant from the CUNY Graduate Center.
1This means, along with each principle P we adopt 2P , KP , etc. On the semantical level, once P holds
in a model, P holds at each node of this model, hence 2P , KP , etc. also hold.
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The knowability paradox purports to show that the verificationist knowability principle,
all truths are knowable,
F → 3KF,
implies that all truths are known, F → KF . The common reaction to the Church-Fitch
proof is that it is not really valid, it is valid (so to speak) only on a technicality, it convicts an
innocent principle according to the letter of the law but unjustly, and the task the paradox
poses is to uncover where the mistake occured. The paradox is also usually considered as
an objection to verificationist2 views since the principle is often taken as definitive of their
position, and an ancillary task taken up by commentators has been to show that such a
view, whatever faults it may have, is not refuted by an argument as swift and simple as
the Church-Fitch construction.
Our goal in this paper is not to defend verificationism but rather to analyse and clarify
the concept of knowability expressed in the verificationist principle.
First (Section 2) we note that the formulation of verificationist knowability in classical
logic, as F → 3KF is not intuitively valid once F is allowed to change from true to false
during the verification process. For example, even if it was raining when Holmes asked
Watson to check for the rain, but the rain had stopped by the time Watson looked outside,
Watson’s answer will be “no rain”; though true, that it is raining does not get verified. We
then provide a new semantical proof that the classical verificationist knowability is indeed
equivalent to the omniscience principle. This analysis indicates that the classical under-
standing of verificationist knowability is not intrinsically valid and should be augmented
by some features representing the constructive view of truth and knowability it is supposed
to express. One solution (Section 4) naturally stems from our semantical analysis: the
verificationist knowability principle is valid for stable truths, those that remain true in the
process of discovery, yielding the stable knowability principle
2F → 3KF
which is equivalent to the version of verificationist knowability restricted to necessary truths
2F → 3K2F . We show that with this principle of stable knowability, the Church-Fitch
paradox disappears. Stable knowability can be offered as a correct classical version
of verificationist knowability and a resolution of the knowability paradox.
Yet another confirmation of the correctness of the stable knowability principle comes
from the intuitionistic analysis of knowability (Section 5). The principle that all truths are
knowable is supposed to represent the core position of the constructively inclined verifica-
tionist, a position which should also be naturally expressible in intuitionistic logic. As is
well-known, the Church-Fitch construction carried out in intuitionistic logic proves only
that
p → ¬¬Kp,
2We use the term ‘verificationist’ synonymously with ‘anti-realist.’
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which some, notably Dummett, consider a superior expression of the verificationist’s posi-
tion. We invoke Gödel’s translation of intuitionsitic to modal logic to find out what sort of
classical principles correspond to intuitionistic knowability, and show that it is equivalent
to the classical principle of monotonic knowability
2F → 32KF
which implies stable knowability but differs from it by assuming that once F becomes
known, it stays known, 2KF . This additional assumption appears because of the limited
expressive power of the intuitionistic language and semantics, where it is implicit in the
understanding of the intuitionistic truth relation .
Furthermore, we offer a logical analysis of the total knowability principle: it is possible
to know whether a proposition holds or not,
3KF ∨3K¬F,
which provides a more general view of knowability (Section 6). We show that total knowa-
bility is strictly stronger than stable knowability and yet does not succumb to the knowa-
bility paradox. This indicates that total knowability is another option to consider for
expressing the idea that all truths are knowable.
These observations open the door to a bi-modal framework for the systematic study of
knowability.3
2 Semantical Analysis of Verificationist Knowability
By the well-known Church-Fitch construction [7, 21], assuming only that knowledge is
factive and distributes across conjunction, along with a minimal amount of modal and
classical logic4:
F → 3KF (VK)
generates the knowability paradox since it implies the omniscience principle that ‘all truths
are known’:
F → KF . (OMN )
Theorem 1 [Church-Fitch] VK yields OMN .
Proof. The idea is to consider the instance of VK with F being the well-known Moore
sentence p ∧ ¬Kp (which we will call Moore):
Moore → 3K(Moore). (VK(Moore))
3See [3, 40, 42, 44] for other bi-modal approaches to the knowability paradox.
4The logic we use is no stronger than that used in the Church-Fitch proof; in most cases, T suffices.
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We first establish that Moore cannot be known.
1. K(Moore) → Kp - since K(X ∧ Y ) → KX;
2. K(Moore) → (p ∧ ¬Kp) → ¬Kp - factivity of knowledge.
Therefore, K(Moore) yields a contradiction Kp and ¬Kp, hence
3. K(Moore) → ⊥ where ⊥ is the the propositional constant false.
Moreover, the Moore sentence cannot possibly be known:
4. 3K(Moore) → 3⊥ - from 3, by modal reasoning;
5. ¬3K(Moore) - from 4, since 3⊥ → ⊥.
Now we apply these findings to VK(Moore):
6. ¬Moore - from 5 and VK(Moore);
7. p → Kp - from 6, since ¬(X ∧ ¬Y ) yields X → Y in classical logic.
The last line is nothing but the omniscience principle OMN. 2
Given this, a stronger result is provable.
Corollary 1 Schemas VK and OMN are equivalent.
Proof. It remains to show that OMN yields VK. By OMN, F → KF . Since KF → 3KF
for reflexive modality 2, F → 3KF . 2
We first present the intuitive semantics of VK (Section 2.1) and then produce a semantic
proof that VK is equivalent to OMN (Section 2.2).
2.1 Verificationist Knowability is not intuitively valid
We begin by first showing that VK is invalid even under circumstances acceptable to the
verificationist. The reason for VK’s invalidity is that even if a correct verification procedure
has been applied to a true proposition F , we can expect a positive result only with the
assumption that F stays true in the process of discovery.
However, this stability assumption is missing in VK and our logical analysis reveals
that this missing assumption is the source of the knowability paradox.5
In a more formal setting, a proposition F is stable in a given model, if it satisfies
F → 2F.
Note that for a reflexive modality 2, F is stable if and only if F ↔ 2F . A stable sentence
can be false at some (or even all) states of a given model, but once it is true at a state, it
5Indeed, it has been noted that non-stability, in particular empirical contingency, is a thorn in the side
of verificationists, see [39, 43, 59, 66]. Verificationist theories of meaning, replacing truth with warranted
assertibility, seem not to be able to handle satisfactorily the semantics of sentences whose warranted
assertibilty changes between states, i.e. which are not stably warrantedly assertible. As we will see,
stability is necessary for the validity of VK, suggesting an explanation of these problems.
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remains true at all 2-accessible states. There are sentences, e.g., propositional constants
> (true) and ⊥ (false) which are stable in any model. Sentences 2F are stable in any
transitive model.
There are no reasons to believe that without the assumption that F is stable, principle
VK is valid in all situations acceptable for the verificationist.
Consider a correct, i.e., knowledge- and knowability-producing verification pro-
cedure, Ver, applied to a true proposition F . However, during (or, perhaps, due
to) verification, F changes its truth value and Ver eventually certifies that F
is false. Then VK fails despite the fact that a correct verification procedure has


















Figure 1: Model M1 where VK fails.
To make this precise, consider the following bi-modal model, M1 = (W, R2, RK, ).
M1 has three states W = {u, v, w} and two accessibility relations, an alethic accessibility
relation R2 (represented by arrows) which is reflexive and according to which w is accessible
from u and v, and an epistemic accessibility relation RK (represented by ovals) which is an
equivalence relation on W such that u and v are equivalent (epistemically indistinguishable)
and w is equivalent only to itself. A requirement for the truth of KF is just that F be
true at all epistemically, RK, indistinguishable states. Suppose also that F holds at u but
not at v or w. We can think of M1 as modeling the process of verification, moving from
ignorance to knowledge by shrinking one’s epistemic possibilities.7
As model M1 shows, F is not stable: though it is true at u, it is not true at w which
is accessible from u. At u and v, Ver cannot come to a definitive conclusion concerning
F : u and v are epistemically indistinguishable so F is not known at either of them. At w,
Ver can only conclude that F is false, since w  ¬F . In M1, ¬KF holds at all words and
hence u  ¬3KF, accordingly
u 1 F → 3KF.
6The process of discovery can be viewed as consisting of (a) choosing the verification procedure Ver out
of the ones available; (b) running Ver on a given input. We argue that there is no generality lost, if we
consider one universal verification meta-procedure Ver and count the choosing of a specific procedure into
the time balance of this universal Ver. Indeed, the process of looking for a proper specific procedure can
be regarded as a run of Ver. Since for the modal language, the meta-procedure is no different from any
other procedure, we can view the whole process of discovery as an application of one universal verification
procedure Ver. So, (a) is subsumed under (b).
7We can also consider M′1, which is S5 with respect to 2, by setting R2 = W 2 in M1.
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The non-stability of F prevents F from being knowable in the sense of VK, despite the
assumption that the agent possesses a correct verification procedure in all of the states.
This suggests that VK does not properly express the idea that all truths are knowable.
2.2 The Knowability Paradox, semantically
The counter-model M1 for VK leads us to consider what the natural frame conditions for
VK are. We find that the answer to this question yields a semantic proof that verificationist
knowability, VK, is equivalent to the omniscience principle, OMN .
To keep our analysis concise, we consider models in which states can be specified: for
each state u there is a specifying proposition Fu such that
u  Fu and for all v 6= u, v 1 Fu.
We call such models specifiable states models or specifiable models, for short. In a sense,
in epistemology, specifiable models are the natural ones since it is natural to expect an
epistemic state to have some combination of features that makes it different from all other
states, i.e., specifies this state. For example, in model M1 from Figure 1, the following
formulas can be regarded as specifying propositions:
Fu = F (u is the state at which F holds);
Fv = ¬F ∧ ¬K¬F (v is the state at which both F and K¬F are false);
Fw = ¬F ∧K¬F (w is the state in which ¬F holds and is known).
In the theory of models for modal logics, specifying propositions can be represented by
special atoms (called nominals, cf. [4]), but, to reduce bookkeeping, we allow specifying
propositions to be regular compound formulas as well. Each model can be made specifiable
by adding fresh atomic specifying propositions: the old formulas all retain their truth
value. Standard soundness/completeness theorems of modal logic extend to specifiable
models automatically.8
A state u is called omniscient if it forms a singleton with respect to RK:
uRKv yields u = v.
At an omniscient state, any true proposition is known, hence also knowable. The following
theorem shows that at a non-omniscient state, specifying propositions, though true, are
not knowable.
Theorem 2 At a non-omniscient state, no specifying proposition is knowable: u 1 3KFu
for all non-onmiscient u’s.
8To make the picture complete, we give an example of a non-specifiable model: W = {a, a′}, R2 =
RK = W ×W , and a, a′  p for all atoms p. In this model, the same formulas hold at a and a′ so none
of these states can be specified in the given bi-modal language. From the epistemic point of view, states a
and a′ are rather the same state, since there is no property which separates these states from each other.
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary non-omniscient state u. There is a state v such that uRKv
and v 6= u. Let Fu be a nominal for u. Then u 1 3KFu. Indeed, w 1 KFu for each w: for
w = u - since v 1 Fu and uRKv, for w 6= u - since w 1 Fu. 2
A model is omniscient if each of its states is omniscient. A model is a model for a
principle (schema) P if all instances of P hold in this model.
The following theorem describes specifiable models in which the verificationist knowa-
bility principle VK holds: they are exactly the omniscient models.
Theorem 3 A specifiable model M is a model of VK if and only if M is omniscient.
Proof. Any omniscient model is a model of VK: for an omniscient model, u  F yields
u  KF . Due to reflexivity of 2, u  KF → 3KF , hence u  3KF .
Consider a specifiable model M with a non-omniscient state u. The following instance
of VK:
Fu → 3KFu
fails at u. Indeed, u  Fu, by the definition of Fu, and u 1 3KFu by Theorem 2. 2
Theorem 3 may be regarded as a semantical version of the Church-Fitch theorem. Note
that Moore sentences play no role in this proof which shows that the knowability paradox
is not intrinsically related to the Church-Fitch proof, and in particular the instance of VK
that is its premise, but rather to the structure of the verificationist knowability principle
VK itself.
We see that assuming the principle of verificationist knowability, VK, trivializes the
epistemic picture: all states are epistemically distinguishable and everything which is true
is known. Our analysis confirms that the Church-Fitch construction is indeed valid: VK
really is equivalent to OMN , and that, strictly speaking, there is no ‘paradox’ just an
unexpected result. Since assuming VK is equivalent to assuming OMN , if the latter is not
acceptable, the former should also be rejected.
Accordingly the analysis affords us a deeper understanding of the verificationist con-
ception of knowledge, and not just knowability. We see that VK-endorsing verificationism
really has no room for ignorance, and more to the point, no room for the idea of investi-
gation or verification as a process that reduces one’s ignorance. VK embodies a picture of
knowledge where the knower moves from one state of knowledge, in which they know all
there is to know, to another (presumably larger) state of knowledge in which they know
all there is to know.9 Such a picture of knowledge seems not to make sense of any kind
of inquiry; it cannot model a scenario where one asks whether F is true or not, engages
9The intuitionist’s ideal mathematician constructing the mathematical universe would be a paradigm
example of such a knower; indeed such a picture expresses a very hardcore constructivism - the constructed
truths are all the truths there are. On such a view it is a truism that one knows all truths, and supposing
there is an unknown truth contradicts this notion of truth, of which Theorem 1 is just a straightforward
justification.
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in research, and with evidence settles the question. Our analysis suggests that VK is not
consistent with even this most schematic description of scientific inquiry.
3 Diagnosis
So, what has gone wrong? From the Church-Fitch proof, it appears that Moore is, if not
the main culprit of the “mystery of the disappearing diamond” [31], then at least a willing
accomplice; that it is integral to the “modal collapse” which [34, 35] argues is the heart
of the paradox. We showed in Section 2.2 that this is not so, and that the problem stems
from VK itself.
Though not guilty of generating the paradox, the presence of Moore is instructive,
indeed an unknowable sentence, like Moore, for knowability principles is like a crash test
for vehicles: it is not a test under normal conditions, but a test of its behavior during
a disaster. It takes quite a different set of specifications and tests to check whether a
vehicle also does its normal job. The semantical analysis of 2.1 and 2.2 was the test under
normal conditions, and we saw that the result of the knowability paradox bears no intrinsic
connection to Moore.
Let us, then, examine the results of the crash test to see how exactly Moore reveals
the structural weakness in VK. In the Church-Fitch proof, VK has been applied to the
Moore sentence which cannot be known. Indeed, K(Moore) is inconsistent in any logic
of knowledge10: K(Moore) yields both Kp and ¬Kp,11 so ¬K(Moore).
This observation allows us to see where the collapse occurs. We have seen (Theorem 1,
line 4) that K(Moore) → ⊥. Since ⊥ implies anything,
K(Moore) ↔ ⊥.
This is the moment when “the diamond disappears.” In any normal modal logic, “the
diamond disappears” from the constant false:
⊥ ↔ 3⊥,
and this is exactly what happens here:
K(Moore) ↔ 3K(Moore)
as well. Therefore, VK(Moore) of the form
Moore → 3K(Moore)




is logically equivalent to
Moore → K(Moore),
which is equivalent to
Moore → ⊥,
i.e., ¬Moore.
It is mentioned frequently that Church-Fitch results hold not just for K but for any
factive and conjunction-distributive operator (as Fitch himself makes clear), e.g., [20, 34,
35, 49, 60]. The “modal collapse” on ⊥ is a well-known phenomenon and hence this
explanation holds for any other factive and distributive operator, O, applied to its un-O-
able and un-O-ed Moore sentence p ∧ ¬Op.
4 Stable Knowability
Our semantic analysis showed that the non-stability of F invalidates the principle of verifi-
cationist knowability. Without the stability assumption stated explicitly, the verificationist
knowability principle VK does not represent verificationist approaches fairly. In this sec-
tion, we show that with the stability assumption made explicit, no paradox results.
Clearly, not all truths are stable, so to distinguish between the knowability of stable and
non-stable truths, we need to explicitly incorporate stability into a knowability principle.
Since the possibility of knowing stable versus non-stable truths captures some of the dis-
tinction between the possibility of knowing necessary versus contingent truths, this would
go some way to distinguishing between, e.g., mathematical and empirical knowability.
How might one represent the knowability of stable truths? Consider the principle all
stable truths are knowable, e.g., if F is a stable truth (F → 2F and F ), then F is
knowable (3KF ):
[(F → 2F ) ∧ F ] → 3KF. (1)
Since for reflexive modality 2, the formula (F → 2F )∧F is logically equivalent to 2F , the
principle (1) can be equivalently presented as 2F → 3KF . These considerations prompt
the following definition of the principle of stable knowability
2F → 3KF. (SK)
Let SK(F), VK(F), etc., denote principles SK, VK, etc., for a given proposition F .
Note that one could envision a seemingly stronger version of stable knowability, e.g., the
principle SK ′:
2F → 3K2F.
However, SK ′ as a schema has the same strength as SK. Indeed, SK (2F ) = 22F →
3K2F which is logically equivalent to SK ′(F ).12
12for transitive 2’s.
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We can also consider the principle of eventual stable knowability, ESK,
32F → 3KF.
Informally ESK expresses that the knowability of F can be concluded from the assumption
that there is a state after which F holds everywhere. It can be shown that 2(SK ) implies
ESK which implies SK. Hence principle ESK is equivalent to SK as well.13
A stronger principle of monotonic knowability, MK , appears as the result of the Gödel
translation of intuitionisitic knowability into the classical bi-modal language, cf. Section 5:
2F → 32KF.
The justification of MK requires some additional assumptions concerning the relation be-
tween the alethic modality 2 and the epistemic modality K and this restricts the domain of
situations in which such knowability holds. We postpone the discussion of MK and corre-
sponding assumptions to Section 5 and concentrate on analyzing the basic and well-justified
stable knowability principle SK.
The semantical analysis in Section 2.2 sheds some light on how stable knowability SK
escapes the knowability paradox: it allows non-omniscient (and meaningful) specifiable
models and hence does not yield the omniscience principle OMN. Due to Theorem 3, to
make this point it suffices to provide a non-omniscient frame in which SK holds in all
models.
















Figure 2: Non-omniscient frame for SK.
Proof. Indeed, if 2X holds at some state, then w  X as well, hence w  KX. Since w
is 2-accessible from each state, 3KX holds at each state.15 2
We can now show that stable knowability does not suffer from the knowability paradox,
in particular, SK does not yield omniscience.
13ESK might be considered a rendering of specifically constructive knowability. In a constructive setting,
a state after which a proposition holds everywhere can be regarded as a state where the proposition has a
proof, in which case ESK can be read as saying that if it is possible that F has a proof, then F is knowable.
14e.g., model M1.
15This argument prompts a general characterization of specifiable SK-models: every state has a 2-
accessible omniscient state.
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Corollary 2 Schema SK does not yield OMN.
Proof. By Theorem 4, all instances of SK hold in M1, but OMN(F) does not. Hence no
combination of instances of SK can yield omniscience with respect to F . 2
5 Intuitionistic vs. Stable Knowability
Given its intuitionistic inspiration, the natural logical perspective to have on VK is intu-
itionistic. Indeed one of the first reactions to the knowability paradox, [56], showed that
in intuitionistic logic the Church-Fitch construction yielded only p → ¬¬Kp, which, when
read from an intuitionistic view point, is not absurd. Indeed some, [9, 16, 43],16 most
notably Dummett, argue that for the verificationist it is superior to VK as a represention
of their sense of knowability. Accordingly, let us try to read verificationist knowability VK
as an intuitionistic principle.
Even a brief perusal of the literature on intuitionistic modal logic shows there is no
widely accepted interpretation of intuitionistic modality, and many logics and families of
logics have been constructed (see for instance [25, 63, 64, 65] for some overviews). Some of
these systems consider independent intuitionistic ‘possibility’ modalities 3, and some do
not. Kripke semantics shows that intuitionistic logic itself can be regarded as a fragment of
the classical modal logic S4 with the modality 2, hence introducing a new modality 3 adds
more modality than seems to be needed to express what the verificationist wants to say
(Rasmussen in [43] makes this a central point of his Mapping Objection). For a discussion
of intuitionistic modality bearing on the knowability paradox, and verificationism more
generally, see [58]; see also [8, 19, 41]. To be precise, by intuitionistic modal logic in this
paper we understand standard modal systems with reflexive 2 and intuitionistic logic. The
‘possibility’ modality 3 is viewed as the dual of 2: 3X is an abbreviation for ¬2¬X.
Theorem 5 With intuitionsitic logic, principles VK and p → ¬¬Kp are equivalent.
Proof. We follow the first six steps of the proof of Theorem 1 and verify that each of them
is made according to intuitionsitic logical rules (we repeat these steps here for the reader’s
convenience):
1. K(Moore) → Kp;
2. K(Moore) → (p ∧ ¬Kp) → ¬Kp;
3. K(Moore) → ⊥;
16Both Dummett and Rasmussen (via Dummett), attribute this view to Bernhard Weiss, who appears
not to have published this. Incidentally, Dummett’s informal reading of IK is “the possibility that F will
come to be known always remains open,” which fits nicely with the frame conditions characterizing SK.
See [39] for objections to IK on the grounds that it yields that no truths are undecided (see also [5, 66]
for related discussions), and see [6, 9, 57] for responses on behalf of the intuitionistically inclined. As with
VK it is not our purpose to defend IK, but to find its proper relation to other knowability principles.
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4. 3K(Moore) → 3⊥ → ⊥;
5. ¬3K(Moore);
6. ¬Moore.
Since intuitionsitically ¬(X ∧ Y ) yields X → ¬Y , we conclude
7. p → ¬¬Kp.
Here is the proof of the other direction.
1. p → ¬¬Kp;
2. 2¬Kp → ¬Kp - by reflexivity of 2;
3. ¬¬Kp → ¬2¬Kp - since X → Y yields ¬Y → ¬X;
4. p → ¬2¬Kp - from 1 and 3, by syllogism;
5. p → 3Kp - since here 3 is ¬2¬. 2
The aforementioned arguments and endorsements justify the following definition. By
intuitionistic knowability we mean the following principle:
F → ¬¬KF. (IK )
In the 1930s Gödel found a faithful embedding of intuitionsitic logic into modal logic
with the S4-style modality: one translates intuitionistic formulas by means of the rule box
every sub-formula [26].17 By g(F ) we denote the Gödel translation of formula F . The
Gödel translation provides a complete characterization of intuitionistic validity: a formula
F is intuitionistically valid if and only if its translation g(F ) is valid in S4.
Gödel’s motivation resulted from the provability reading of the 2 modality, hence boxing
a formula G forces a constructive reading of it as G is provable rather than classically as G is
true. The Kripke semantics for intuitionistic and modal logics revealed that on the semantic
level, the Gödel translation specifies intuitionistic logic as a fragment of the classical modal
logic S4 satisfying the stability condition: what is true remains true (see Section 5.1 for
more discussion on stability and constructive semantics).
Via the Gödel embedding we see that stability is a faithful modal reincarnation of
provability. Indeed, once a proof of F becomes available at a state u, in all further states
F holds true. Conversely, if there is no proof of F at u, then a state at which F fails is
consistent with u and hence, in principle, possible at u. Stability is provability expressed
in a modal language.18
Note that the Gödel translation of IK(p) is
g(IK(p)) = 2(2p → 2¬2¬2K2p) = 2(2p → 232K2p).
As a schema, g(IK) is equivalent to the following principle of monotonic knowability:
2F → 32KF. (MK)
17Gödel in [26] offered two translations, each of which is essentially equivalent in S4 to the rule box every
sub-formula.
18In the Logic of Proofs which combines the relational and provability readings of intuitionistic logic,
this argument is captured by the Realization Theorem and the notion of fully explanatory models ([1, 22]).
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Theorem 6 Principles g(IK) and MK are equivalent.
Proof. It is an easy exercise in modal logic to show that for a reflexive 2,
g(IK )(F ) → MK (F )
which yields that as a schema, g(IK) implies MK.
To show the converse, assume MK and consider MK (2F ) = 22F → 32K2F .
Then
1. 2F → 32K2F - by transitivity;
2. 2(2F → 32K2F ) - by necessitation;
3. 22F → 232K2F - by distribution;
4. 2F → 232K2F - by transitivity;
5. 2(2F → 232K2F ) which is nothing but g(IK)(F) - by necessitation. 2
We will now show that MK is stronger than SK and reveal the additional assumptions
which, given SK, should be made to justify MK.
Theorem 7 Principle MK is strictly stronger than SK.
Proof. It is easy to see that MK logically implies SK for a reflexive 2.




















Figure 3: Model M2 where MK fails.
It is immediate that any instance of SK holds in M2. Indeed, if 2X holds at some
node, then w  X, hence w  KX and 3KX holds at each node.
Let us show that MK fails at u. Indeed, u  2F . On the other hand, u 1 KF , hence
2KF fails at both u and w. Therefore, 32KF fails at both u and w since these nodes are
only 2-accessible from each other. Hence 2F → 32KF fails at u. 2
Apparently, schema g(IK) (i.e., MK) incorporates, along with stability, some other
specifically intuitionistic assumptions concerning 2 and K. Stable knowability SK states
that given a stable truth F , there is a possible state (moment of the discovery process) in
which the verification procedure confirms F . Intuitionistic knowability g(IK)/MK seem-
ingly states the same: there is a possible state in which the verification procedure confirms
13
F . However, since in the intuitionistic universe, once KF becomes true, it stays true, i.e.,
2KF holds. In this respect, model M2 is not an intuitionistic universe: KF holds at w,
but does not stay true there, i.e., w 1 2KF .
In terms of verification, g(IK)/MK states that there is a possible world at which the
verification procedure confirms F , i.e., F becomes known, KF , and hence stays known,
2KF . This additional assumption appears because of the limited expressive power of the
intuitionistic language and semantics, where this assumption is implicit in the semantics
of . The classical modal language is more flexible and is able to express both SK and IK
(via the Gödel translation).
Analogous to the Gödel embedding, the explicit assumption of stability has the effect of
making explicit some of the constructive meaning of VK in the classical language via SK.
In [43] Rasmussen calls VK “an amphibious hybrid between the points of view of realism
and of anti-realism” (in logical terms, between classical and intuitionistic logic); we see just
how apt a description this is.
What we observe here is the remarkably robust character of stable knowability and its
ability to represent the constructive intent of verificationist knowability and its compati-
bility with intuitionsitic knowability.
5.1 Stability vs. constructive semantics
Now we want to address the issue of whether our analysis of the role of the stability
requirement gives us a deeper understanding of the verificationist conception of knowability.
The history of studies of constructive, e.g., intuitionistic, logic has two distinguished tra-
ditions. First, there is the constructive ‘witness’ semantics, which originated in Brouwer’s
works and manifested itself in the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics in which wit-
nesses are viewed as proofs. Within this tradition, F is true is understood as
there is a proof of F,
i.e., via the informal existential quantifier over proofs.
The second tradition can be traced back to intuitionistic Kripke semantics, according
to which F is true means
F holds in all possible situations,
i.e., via the informal universal quantifier over possible worlds. Intuitionisitic truth in this
second ‘universal’ setting is stable: if F is true at u, F stays true at all other worlds
accessible from u.
Reconciling these two traditions in a comprehensive formal model has been a longtime
challenge in the area of constructive semantics. The first steps were made by Gödel’s
embedding discussed above. Later Gödel sketched a way to assign proof-like objects to
each occurrence of modality in S4 [27]; this project of Gödel’s was completed in the Logic
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of Proofs [1] which connected the ‘existential’ and ‘universal’ intuitionistic semantics: a
formula F is true in the monotone ‘universal’ semantics if and only if F is true in the
‘existential’ semantics of proofs.
Our study suggests that similar developments can occur in the study of verificationist
knowability. The standard verificationist justification of VK is based on the ‘existential’
witness semantics of constructive truth. What we offer in our analysis is a Kripke-style
‘universal’ semantics of knowability with the core stability condition leading to SK and rely
on the intrinsic connection of stability and provability which informally connects it to the
‘existential’ semantics.
We wish to think that the principle of stable knowability SK provides a plausible modal
resolution of the Church-Fitch paradox: SK is the correct modal expression of the verifi-
cationist view of knowability. In this respect, the problem of finding a bi-modal principle
to adequately express verificationist knowability finds a reasonable solution in SK. The
natural next step would be to capture the ‘existential’ witness side of knowability and we
hope that SK could play a role there too.
Despite the seemingly different character of our approach to the traditional verifica-
tionist justification of the knowability principle, the aforemantioned history of reconciling
the two semantic traditions for intuitionsitic logic gives us a certain hope that a similar
reconciliation over stable knowability principles SK is possible as well. We hope that this
will become the subject of future studies.19
6 A Bigger Picture of Knowability
Generally speaking, knowability can be thought of as a generalization of decidability.20 To
say ‘F is knowable’ is to say that one knows of a procedure which, if carried out in an
appropriate situation, would yield a decision on the truth of F. So the knowability of F
amounts to the possibility of knowing F or the possibility of knowing ¬F. Accordingly, the
proper formalisation of the claim that F is knowable is the principle of total knowability:
3KF ∨3K¬F. (TK)
The principle of total knowability asserts that, for any proposition, there is a verification
procedure, runs of which are represented by the alethic modality 3, which yields a definitive
answer as to whether F or ¬F . From this point of view, TK is a meaningful principle of
possible knowledge. We show that TK is strictly stronger than stable knowability, but TK
also escapes the Church-Fitch paradox.
19One may try some other format of representing this notion of knowability. Such a possibility is
investigated by Dean and Kurokawa, [11], who consider the principle ‘if F is true, then there exists a proof
of F ’ instead of VK and use the framework of the Quantifed Logic of Proofs (see [1, 2] and [23]).
20A classic statement “a closed formula A is (formally) decidable, if A is either provable or refutable, i.e.
if either ` A or ` ¬A” [32].
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How should we understand TK? TK represents a conception of knowability distinct
from the verificationist’s favoured version. Hence, unlike Melia [37], we do not argue that
TK should be viewed as a re-interpretation of VK, which preserves the verificationist’s
constructive motivations but does not succumb to the knowability paradox. We will show
that the latter point is indeed correct, but the former should be resisted.
It has been argued, [45, 46, 60, 68], that TK is in fact not compatible with the verifica-
tionist’s motivations. Williamson and Rückert point out that TK is consistent with there
being truths which are unknowable (we prove this in Theorem 8), which means they are
inconsistent with the verificationist’s manifestation requirement; the requirement that the
understanding of a proposition be manifested in an (in principle) ability to verify it if true.
Indeed, according to Dummett, denying TK is a necessary condition for even stating the
verificationist’s position21 vis a vis the realist. The tension between verificationism (VK)
and TK is further brought out by Wright and Salerno; according to them it is evident that
we do not know ourselves to posses the means for deciding every proposition. Hence the
verificationist is committed to the possibility that TK is false alongside also holding that
VK is true. Accordingly the verificationist cannot accept TK as a better expression of the
intent behind VK.22
We have no reason to disagree with any of this: TK represents a broadly constructive
position that applies to all types of propositions, and which is distinct from VK. We prove
formally that TK does not succumb to the knowability paradox.
What is the relation between TK and VK?
Theorem 8 Principle TK does not yield VK.
Proof. Consider again model M1. First, we note that since w forms a singleton with
respect to RK, for each formula X, either w  KX or w  K¬X. Since w is accessible
from each node, 3KX ∨3K¬X holds at each node. Therefore all instances of TK hold in
M1. However, M1 6 VK. Indeed, u  F but obviously, KF does not hold at any node,
hence u 6 3KF , and so
u 6 VK.
2
On the other hand the converse does hold.
Theorem 9 Principle VK yields TK.23
Proof.
1. F → 3KF - an instance of VK;
21[46] makes this point.
22In fact VK implies TK, given excluded middle, (see Theorem 9), hence the possibility that TK is false
yields the possibility that verificationism, VK, is false. The resolution of this problem, according to the
verificationist, is to reject excluded middle, see [46] for a more careful statement of this line of thought.
23Substantially the same proof can be found in [68].
16
2. ¬F → 3K¬F - an instance of VK;
3. F ∨ ¬F - excluded middle;
4. 3KF ∨3K¬F - from 1–3, by propositional reasoning. 2
What is the relation between knowability and stable knowability?
Theorem 10 Principle TK yields SK.
Proof. More specifically, we establish that TK(F) yields SK(F).
1. K(¬F ) → ¬F - factivity of knowledge;
2. F → ¬K¬F - contrapositive of 1 and double negation principle;
3. 2F → 2¬K¬F - from 2, by 2-necessitation, distribution;
4. 2F → ¬3K¬F - from 3, converting 2¬ into ¬3;
5. ¬3K¬F → 3KF - conversion of X ∨ Y into ¬Y → X in TK(F);
6. 2F → 3KF - from 4, 5, by propositional reasoning. The latter is SK(F). 2
The converse however does not hold.
Theorem 11 Principle SK does not yield TK.




Figure 4: Model M3 where SK holds but TK fails.
It is easy to see that in M3 all instances of SK hold. Indeed, for any proposition X,
if 2X holds at some node, then X holds in the whole of M3, hence both KX and 3KX
hold in M3. Therefore 2X → 3KX holds in M3. It now suffices to show that TK(F)
fails in M3. Indeed, u 1 KF and u 1 K¬F and hence u 1 3KF and u 1 3K¬F , so
u 1 TK(F). 2
There is an informal explanation of the scenario represented by model M3. We have a
thorough verification procedure, i.e., it can observe all epistemically possible states, which
does not confirm F because it sees that F does not hold in all epistemic states, hence TK
fails. But because it is thorough it sees that if F held in all states it would be known,
hence SK is vacuously true at each node. Unlike TK, SK does not take any knowability
obligations with respect to non-stable truths.
Theorem 12 Principle VK yields MK.
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Proof. By Theorem 1, VK yields F → KF . By necessitation and distributivity, 2F →
2KF . By reflexivity, 2KF → 32KF , hence 2F → 32KF . 2
Theorem 13 Principle MK does not yield TK.
Proof. All instances of MK hold in model M3. Indeed, for any proposition X, if 2X
holds at some node, then X holds in the whole of M3, hence, KX, 2KX, and 32KX
hold in M3. As shown in Theorem 11, TK fails in M3. 2
Theorem 14 Principle TK does not yield MK.
Proof. Consider model M2 in Figure 3. According to Theorem 7, MK fails in M2. On
the other hand, each instance of TK holds in M2. Indeed, w is 2-accessible from each
node and w is omniscient hence, for each X, either KX or K¬X hold at w. 2
Theorem 15 Principle MK does not yield VK.
Proof. Each instance of MK holds in model M1. Indeed, if 2X holds anywhere in M1
then w  X, hence w  KX, and w  2KX. Therefore, 32KX holds at each node of
M1. As before, VK(F) fails in M1, in particular, u  F and u 1 3KF . 2
6.1 Knowability Diamond






























Figure 5: “Knowability Diamond”
Arrows represent generality/strength of the corresponding principles as schemes: X −→
Y reads as each model of X is a model for Y , or, equivalently, principle X yields principle
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Y . A more general principle is less strong logically. None of the converse arrows holds. So,
VK is the most restrictive of the four - it holds only in omniscient models - and SK is the
most general, has the most models of the four.
Does the “Knowability Diamond” offer a resolution to the Church-Fitch paradox? We
argue that it does.
Principles TK and IK have been discussed before and the resolutions they provide have
been criticized.24 Stable knowability SK seems to be a better candidate for a resolution
of the paradox since (a) SK provides a definitive answer to the core question of what
went wrong with VK - the stability assumption was missing; (b) SK is a well-principled
restriction of VK since it eliminates from consideration only non-stable truths which has
been definitively diagnosed as the reason for the failure of VK; (c) SK has the same format
as VK hence does not invoke any new scenarios, does not change the problem.
6.2 Safe knowability principles
It is immediate from Figure 5 that neither TK, nor SK, nor MK fall into the scope of the
Church-Fitch paradox, i.e., none of them yield OMN .
Let us take a closer look at how with stable knowability SK instead of verificationist
knowability VK the knowability paradox disappears. A simple repetition of the Church-
Fitch argument with SK(Moore) only proves that ¬2(p ∧ ¬Kp), i.e., 3OMN, which is
strictly weaker than OMN .25 One can equivalently rewrite ¬2(p ∧ ¬Kp) as
2p → 3Kp
which incidentally is SK(p) stating informally that
if p holds at all states, then it is possible it becomes known at one of them.
This conclusion does not appear paradoxical.26
24One could argue that both TK and IK change the problem rather than solve it. The format of TK
is quite different from the original VK; it has been noted that TK is implied by VK, but is at the same
time incompatible with what VK is supposed to express (see footnotes 16, 22 and 23 and the beginning
of Section 6). Reading verificationist knowability as SK resolves this. The same holds for IK which is
expressed in a different logic, with a quite different semantics; its translation, MK, into the classical modal
language also does not match the original format of VK. It is not clear, in what sense a paradox associated
with VK can be solved without providing a satisfactory explanation of the problems with VK and by
considering other principles instead.
25This result is adumbrated in [45].
26Moreover, consider what happens if F is not stable. Let us assume that all non-stable truths are
knowable, i.e., (F ∧¬2F ) → 3KF . A repetition of the Church-Fitch proof yields (p∧¬Kp) → 2(p∧¬Kp).
If all non-stable truths are knowable, then ignorance cannot disappear in the process of verification. This
is rather counter-intuitive and provides further confirmation that the knowabilty paradox is due to the
unstated assumption that known propositions are stable.
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7 Comparisons
What we offer is a logical framework for studying different kinds of knowability. The above
results suggest some plausible alternatives, TK, MK, or SK, to VK as an understanding
of the notion that all truths are knowable. These alternatives in turn yield a principled
restriction on VK. We have seen that VK implicitly assumes that truths are stable. Ac-
cordingly, if one wants to endorse VK, then its scope should be restricted to stable truths
and when this is made explicit in SK, OMN does not result. How does this stability
restriction compare to other prominent restriction strategies?
7.1 Edgington
In [17, 18], Edgington argues that only actual truths are knowable. She proposes that the
knowability principle should be read as
AF → 3KAF ,
where ‘A’ is the modal operator ‘actually.’ Methodologically, this approach looks compati-
ble with our restriction of the knowability principle to ‘stable truth’ only. However, within
the straightforward formalization of ‘actuality’ in [17] as
u  AwF if and only if w  F,
Edgington’s proposal turns out to be trivial. In any model, AF is equivalent to a proposi-
tional constant > (true) or ⊥ (false). Therefore, assuming the ‘actual knowability’ schema
above is equivalent to assuming VK for the propositional constants > and ⊥, which trivially
holds in each model regardless of any knowability assumptions.27
7.2 Tennant and Dummett
Tennant in [49, 50, 51] argues that only Cartesian propositions are knowable where “a
Cartesian proposition is a proposition F such that KF is consistent” [50]. The Cartesian
restriction provides a correct negative test for the knowability of a proposition - if a propo-
sition is not Cartesian, then it is not knowable. Indeed, if F is non-Cartesian, then KF is
formally inconsistent, hence in an appropriate logic L, L ` ¬KF . Then by necessitation,
L ` 2¬KF and hence L ` ¬3KF .
However, being Cartesian does not necessarily imply being knowable. In particular, a
true Cartesian proposition may still not be knowable, and hence Cartesian-ness does not
give the positive conditions under which a proposition is knowable, if true.28 Consider
27An interesting development of Edgington’s proposal can be found in [42], which considers a non-
Kripkian semantics for actuality and knowledge.
28[28, 29, 35, 61] argue that the Cartesian restriction is ad hoc, our analysis (in 3) shows that while the
restriction does not provide a positive test for knowability, it may not be as ad hoc as they argue.
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VK(p) with a propositional letter p for F ; this instance of F is clearly Cartesian. Consider


















Figure 6: Model M-p where VK(p) fails.
The same argument as accompanied M1 shows that M-p is a scenario which is ac-
ceptable from a verificationist point of view in which VK(p) fails. Model M-p shows that
being Cartesian and true, without also being stable, is insufficient to guarantee the truth of
VK. The validity of VK(F) depends on the stability of F , as we have seen, and Cartesian
propositions are not necessarily stable.29
Note that if p is atomic or basic, then the above argument shows that the restriction
on VK proposed in [15] is also too weak.
8 Conclusion
In [53] van Benthem argues that “what one really wants is a new systematic viewpoint”
from which to approach the knowability paradox rather than just attempting to avoid it
by weakening either the logic in the Church-Fitch proof or VK itself.30 We argue that the
knowability framework and our semantic analysis achieves this. The contribution of this
work can be summarized as follows.
• An alternative, semantic proof that VK = OMN. This could be a serious argument
that the paradox is due to the principle VK itself rather than the Church-Fitch proof.
• A case has been made that the key requirement of the verificationist argument in
favor of VK, stability of the truth in question, is missing in VK and its lack alone is
a sufficient explanation for the paradox.
• A corrected and justified version of verificationist knowability, the stable knowabil-
ity principle SK, was offered and shown to be paradox-free. This is our suggested
resolution of the Church-Fitch paradox.
29In the same vein, [61, 62] argues that a Cartesian proposition can still yield OMN via a more complex
proof than the one by Church and Fitch (Theorem 1). But see [52] for a reply.
30One might argue that we do the latter, but our framework justifies why this is legitimate.
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• The monotonic knowability principle MK was introduced and shown to be a faithful
classical counterpart of intuitionistic knowability IK.
• A formal logical framework was offered. The resulting “Knowability Diamond” an-
swers the question of the relative strength/generality of all four knowability principles
considered.
We see that there is no need to adopt a non-classical logic31 or to reject any of the
epistemic principles used in the Church-Fitch proof. Indeed, the simplicity and plausibil-
ity of the principles appealed to in the proof is what makes the derivation of OMN so
‘paradoxical.’ Our approach preserves them all.
Our framework helps to clarify debates about the nature of verificationist knowability
and its tenability. Due to the knowability paradox and the fact that VK yields the un-
acceptable OMN , there is a need for new bi-modal principles reflecting the constructive
content of the verificationist principle of knowability. Our framework offers three possibil-
ities, none of which leads to the knowability paradox.
• Stable knowability SK. This approach preserves the format of VK by limiting it to
its epistemically justified stable version SK.
• Monotonic knowability MK which reflects the specifically intuitionistic reading of
knowability. MK is stronger than SK, but more restrictive; it stipulates that once a
proposition becomes known is stays known at all further steps.
• Knowability in a general setting reflected by the principle of total knowability TK.
This approach attempts to preserve the idea that all truths are knowable.
The value of the framework comes not just from the results pertaining to the knowability
paradox but also from the bigger explanatory picture it provides. It becomes possible not
only to establish logical dependencies between principles, but also to definitively certify the
absence of such dependencies which was not possible outside a rigorous logical framework.
Such a framework allows us to begin systematically studying a concept which pervades
epistemology. The possibility or impossibiliy of knowledge is central to debates about
skepticism. The existence of a priori knowledge turns on the possibility or impossibility of
knowing independently of experience.32 To make more palatable the closure properties of
the epistemic operator K, formal epistemological approaches sometimes gloss it as knowable
[10, 48], or as is entitled to know [24], or as potential knowledge [22]. Verificationists, of
course, put the possibilities of knowledge at their center. Given how central knowability
is to so many core epistemological topics, a direct investigation of it and its properties is
warranted. We think the above analyses and principles constitute a step in this direction.
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